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Abstract—Vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have recently
attracted a lot of attention due to their immense potentials and
applications. Wide range of coverage and accessibility to end users
make VANETs a good target for commercial companies. In this
paper, we consider a scenario in which advertising companies aim
to disseminate their advertisements in different areas of a city by
utilizing VANETs infrastructure. These companies compete for
renting the VANETs infrastructure to spread their advertisements.
We partition the city map into different blocks, and consider
a manager for all the blocks who is in charge of splitting the
time between interested advertising companies. Each advertising
company (AdC) is charged proportional to the allocated time. In
order to find the best time splitting between AdCs, we propose
a Stackelberg game scheme in which the block manager assigns
the companies to the blocks and imposes the renting prices to
different companies in order to maximize its own profit. Based
on this, AdCs request the amount of time they desire to rent
the infrastructure in order to maximize their utilities. To obtain
the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, a mixed integer non-
linear optimization problem is solved using the proposed optimal
and sub-optimal algorithms. The simulation results demonstrate
that the sub-optimal algorithm approaches the optimal one in
performance with lower complexity.
Index Terms—Vehicular ad-hoc networks, Mobile advertising,
Stackelberg game, Time splitting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) have attracted
considerable interests due to their emerging applications such
as collision avoidance, route finding, multi-hop transmission
and traffic control [1]–[4]. These networks are built upon
two main components which are vehicles and infrastructure.
The infrastructure in VANETs mainly consists of roadside
units (RSUs) used for communication to vehicles. In addition,
the vehicles are both capable of communicating with RSU
and spreading the information among themselves with low
latency [5].
These networks are mainly developed for safety purposes
such as collision avoidance. However, such networks with
great capability of access to end users have always been
enticing for advertising companies (AdCs) [6], [7]. Consider
a scenario in which AdCs rent VANETs RSUs for some
period of time in order to spread their commercials among the
vehicles (infrastructure-to-vehicle (I2V) mode). This scenario
can potentially lead to a substantial amount of profit for an AdC.
This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under
grants ECCS-1444009 and CNS-1824518.
Moreover, the VANETs manager can rely on these networks as
a potential source of profit by charging the AdCs accordingly.
Until now, most of the literature in VANETs is dedicated
to designing efficient routing protocols, describing mobility
models, and improving routing efficiency using clustering based
approaches [8]–[11]. Nevertheless, there have also been some
works on VANETs advertisement in which the most related
ones are [6], [7], [12]–[14]. In [6], an auction-based framework
is proposed to rent the blocks to the eager AdCs. In [7], an
online-learning algorithm is proposed to perform block selection
for AdCs with no prior information about the density of the
vehicles inside the blocks. Although similar studies may exist
in the literature, there is a lack of study focusing on modeling
the interactions between AdCs and the manager which is in
charge of controlling VANETs RSUs. This paper is prompted
mainly due to this shortage. In [12], a scheme is proposed
in which buses are the seeds of advertisement spreading in
VANETs. It is assumed that all buses have the same set of
advertising segments. In this scheme, buses have to find the most
valuable segments for their surrounding vehicles and spread
these segments. Afterwards, the authors use the coalition game
in order to guide private vehicles to build broadcast coalitions
when there is no bus available in the area. In [13], a scenario
is considered in which public transportation vehicles are the
sources of advertisement spreading. The goal in that study is
to find the most influential seeds to maximize the spreading
range of the advertisement in the network. They have done an
experimental study on two cities in China in order to obtain
the temporal correlations for social centralities of vehicles to
find the best initial seeds. In [14], a framework is proposed for
virtual marketing in which vehicles communicate to find the
possible matches between queries and demands.
One of the key challenges in the VANET advertisement
scheme is managing the trading scheme between AdCs and
the manager. The manager has to decide how to split the time
between eager AdCs which are interested in the same area of
a city for the purpose of advertising spreading using RSUs.
More precisely, the manager has to assign the existing RSUs to
the AdCs and split the time of utilization between them while
making a satisfactory profit.
In this paper, we consider a scenario in which AdCs can rent
the RSUs from the manager for limited time periods. The goal
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is to find the optimal leasing times for these AdCs given their
utilities in such a way that the manager makes the maximum
profit while fulfilling the companies’ demands. Here, we propose
a model based on the Stackelberg game which has a good match
for the problem in hand and develop an analytic framework for
the problem. In order to obtain the Stackelberg Equilibrium of
the game, two algorithms are proposed. One of them is capable
of solving the problem optimally with a high computation
complexity. As an alternative, another algorithm is proposed
which has a lower computation complexity with a sub-optimal
solution. In simulation, good performance of the sub-optimal
algorithm is revealed as compared to the optimal algorithm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model and the VANET advertisement scheme are presented in
Section II. In addition, the Stackelberg game basic definitions
and adaptation to the VANET advertisement problem are
presented as well. The details for obtaining the Stackelberg
equilibrium is discussed in Section III. Simulation results are
depicted in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Scenario Description
The infrastructure in VANETs consists of different RSUs used
to both spread information to vehicles and gather information
from them. In the mobile advertising scheme, a vehicle can
receive the advertisements from one of these RSUs in the I2V
mode. Consider a scenario in which different AdCs are willing
to disseminate their advertisements through a city using the
VANETs infrastructure. We grid the city map into different
blocks where each block corresponds to an area of the city. In
this scenario, an AdC might be interested in disseminating its
advertisements through specific blocks. Note that each block
should be under the coverage of at least one of the RSUs so
that the advertisements can be spread among the vehicles inside
the block. We consider a block manager who is in charge of
allocating the RSUs between AdCs. The block manager charges
the AdCs upon using the infrastructure accordingly.
Here, we partition the time into multiple non-overlapping
time-batches each with a certain duration. At each time-batch,
it is assumed that there are a finite number of AdCs willing to
rent the RSUs in each block. At the beginning of each time-
batch, the block manager splits the available time between the
available AdCs and let each of them spread its advertisement
during its allocated portion. This splitting should be performed
in such a manner that jointly maximizes the block manager
and AdCs’ utility. The competition begins when there are more
than one AdC who are interested in a certain block in the
same time-batch. In this paper, we aim to answer the following
question: How much time should be allocated to each of these
AdCs in order to maximize the block manager’s profit, and what
is the best strategy for AdCs so as to maximize their profits?
A schematic of our model is depicted in Fig. 1. The block
manager assigns the AdCs to some of the blocks and imposes
Block 
Manager
Pool of Advertising Companies
RSU
Figure 1: A typical schematic for VANET.
the prices for each of the participants available in the pool
of that block. This price demonstrates the cost per unit time
which the corresponding AdC has to pay in order to rent
the infrastructure. According to this price, each of the AdCs
requests the amount of time they need in order to rent the
infrastructure for advertisement. To model this scenario, we
exploit the Stackelberg competition scheme.
B. Stackelberg Game and VANET Advertising Problem
Consider a case in which the city is gridded into M blocks, and
there are N AdCs willing to rent the blocks. Here, for the jth
block, we partition the time into multiple non-overlapping time-
batches each with the duration of Tj . In this manner, the kth
time-batch captures the time interval of t ∈ [(k − 1) Tj , kTj).
Without loss of generality, we focus on the kth time-batch of all
the blocks where k is a fixed non-negative integer. We assume
that the vehicles density is constant during each time-batch.
Each AdC i is interested in renting at most Mi blocks for its
advertisement. Through the rest, we refer to AdCs as followers
and the block manager as the leader to be consistent with the
framework of the Stackelberg game theory. We define the ith
follower’s satisfaction function in block j as:
S(ti,j) = λi,j
(
1− e−αj
ti,j
Ti,j
)
, ∀i, j (1)
where ti,j is the requested time by follower i at block j, Ti,j is
a parameter subject to design, αj ≥ 1 is the vehicle density at
block j, and λi,j is the maximum satisfaction value1. From (1),
it can be seen that the satisfaction function is equal to zero if
ti,j = 0, and it is an increasing function with respect to ti,j .
However, the rate of increase becomes smaller as ti,j gets larger
1λi,j = 0 implies that follower i is not interested in block j for some
reason.
(diminishing returns), and eventually saturates at the maximum
value of λi,j . Here, we introduce the binary variable ai,j in order
to specify whether the AdC i advertises in block j (ai,j = 1)
or not (ai,j = 0). Moreover, the followers’ utility function can
be defined as the difference between their satisfaction and the
charged price by the leader. The utility function of each AdC i
is given by:
Ui(ti,pi,ai) =
M∑
j=1
ai,j(S(ti,j)− pi,jti,j), ∀i, (2)
where pi,j is the unit price imposed to the follower i for block
j, ti = [ti,1, ti,2, . . . , ti,M ]T ,pi = [pi,1, pi,2, . . . , pi,M ]T ,ai =
[ai,1, ai,2, . . . , ai,M ]. Each follower aims to maximize its utility
selfishly. Thus, given the prices and assignment variables by
the leader, the follower i’s sub-game can be written as:
(P1) : max
ti
Ui(ti,pi,ai),
s.t. ti,j ≥ 0, ∀j.
where ti,j is requested by the AdC, while the manager decides
to accept the request or not in each block. On the other hand,
the leader attempts to maximize its utility which is the total
revenue obtained from the followers. This is called the leader’s
sub-game which can be written as:
(P2) : max
p,a
UM (t,p,a) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
ai,jpi,jti,j
s.t. C1 : pi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j
C2 :
N∑
i=1
ai,jti,j ≤ Tj ,∀j
C3 :
M∑
j=1
ai,j ≤Mi, ∀i
C4 : ai,j ∈ {0, 1},
where t,p,a are the matrices with elements ti,j , pi,j , ai,j , ∀i, j,
respectively. As can be seen, the leader aims to maximize its
revenue by assigning the AdCs to blocks and determining the
prices, while the constraint on the total available time is met.
III. THE STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM (SE)
In this section, we aim to find the SE of the proposed game.
Definition 1. Let r denote the strategy set spanned by p and a.
Moreover, let r∗ and t∗ denote the optimal strategy for the
leader, and followers, respectively. Then, the point (r∗, t∗i ) is a
SE if the following conditions are satisfied [15]:
U(r∗, t∗) ≥ U(r, t∗), ∀ r, (3)
Ui(t
∗, r∗) ≥ Ui(ti, t−i∗, r∗), ∀ ti ≥ 0. (4)
where t−i∗ is the optimal time matrix including the optimal
time vector for all the followers except follower i [16].
In what follows, we aim to obtain the SE of the proposed game
using backward induction [17], [18].
A. Followers’ sub-game
Lemma 1. Given the allocated vector pi and block assignment
vector ai for the ith follower, its sub-game has a global optimal
solution given by:
t∗i,j(pi,j) =
(
Ti,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
)+
, ∀j, (5)
where (x)+ , max(x, 0).
Proof: Given ai and pi, we need to obtain the Hessian
matrix of Ui(ti) for each follower i which is only a function
of ti. For all n 6= m, we have:
∂2Ui(ti)
∂ti,nti,m
= 0, ∀i. (6)
The diagonal elements of the Hessian matrix are:
∂2Ui(ti)
∂t2i,j
= −λi,j
α2i,j
T 2i,j
e
−αi ti,jTi,j , ∀j. (7)
Thus, the Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite and the
objective function is concave. As a result, the followers’ sub-
game is a convex optimization problem. The best strategy
for each follower i can be obtained by setting the first order
derivative of the utility function with respect to ti,j equal to
zero. After some manipulations, the optimal solution for ti,j
can be written as in (5).
Setting the optimal solution for each ti,j , ∀i, j greater than
or equal to zero, the following condition can be obtained:
pi,j ≤ λi,jαj
Ti,j
, ∀i. (8)
If this constraint is not met for a follower, its corresponding
term in utility function in (2) takes a negative value. In this
situation, follower i prefers to back off and resign the game.
B. Leader’s sub-game
Substituting the optimal solution of the followers’ sub-game
into the leader’s sub-game and imposing the constraints in (8),
one can obtain the following optimization problem (P3) for the
leader:
max
p,a
U(p,a) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
ai,j
(
pi,jTi,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
)
s.t. C1, C3, C4,
Cˆ2 :
N∑
i=1
ai,j
(
Ti,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
)
≤ Tj ,∀j
C5 : pi,j ≤ λi,jαj
Ti,j
, ∀i, j.
As can be seen, the optimization problem (P3) is a non-convex
mixed integer nonlinear optimization problem (MINLP), and
the objective function of the problem is non-convex. The non-
convexity arises due to the multiplication of ai,j by pi,j . Thus,
this problem can not be solved using a tractable method and
needs reformulation. In the following section, we propose two
algorithms capable of solving the leader optimization problem.
IV. SOLUTION FOR THE LEADER SUB-GAME
A. Optimal solution using Generalized Bender’s Decomposition
(GBD) Algorithm
The GBD algorithm consists of solving an alternating sequence
of relaxed problems including mixed integer linear problems
(MILP) called master problems and convex optimization prob-
lems called primal problems. At each iteration, the algorithm
generates an upper bound and a lower bound on the MINLP
solution. The lower bound of the optimal solution LB(l) can
be obtained from the objective value of the primal problem,
while the upper bound of the optimal solution UB(l) is the
objective value of the master problem. The master problem is
an integer linear problem that can be solved efficiently using
standard optimization toolboxes, e.g, MOSEK. As the iterations
proceed, two sequences of updated upper bounds and lower
bounds converge to the optimal solution in a finite number of
iterations [19]. More details are given below.
1) Problem Reformulation: The optimization problem (P3)
is non-convex due to the multiplicative term of ai,jpi,j . To apply
the GBD algorithm, we recast (P3) to an equivalent convex
MINLP optimization problem as (P4):
max
p,a
U(p,a) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
pi,jTi,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
s.t. C1, C3, C4, C5
C˜2 :
N∑
i=1
Ti,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
≤ Tj ,∀j
C6 :
Ti,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
≤ ai,jTj ,∀j.
As can be seen in (P3), each binary variable ai,j is multiplied
by a term in the objective function and Cˆ2. The role of this
binary variable is to make such terms zero when ai,j = 0 and
leave them as they are when ai,j = 1. In (P4), it can be seen
that variables ai,j are not multiplied by the corresponding terms
in the objective function and C˜2. Instead of this, constraint C6
is added. In constraint C6, if ai,j = 0, after some manipulations,
it can be simplified as λi,jαj/Ti,j ≤ pi,j . Together with C5, the
only possible value for pi,j is pi,j = λi,jαj/Ti,j , which forces
the terms associated with follower i and block j in the objective
function and C˜2 to become zero. Otherwise, if ai,j = 1, C6
for the follower i in block j becomes redundant since Tj is an
upper bound for it based on Cˆ2. We can now observe that the
optimization problem (P4) is a convex MINLP. In addition, the
continuous variables p and the binary variables a are decoupled.
Hence, we can deploy GBD to solve (P4).
Algorithm 1: Generalized Bender’s Decomposition
1 Initialize a(0),
2 Set convergence error ,
Upper bound UB(l) =∞, Lower bound LB(l) = 0.
3 l← 1
4 while |UB(l) − LB(l)| ≥  do
5 Solve primal problem and obtain p∗,β(l)∗,γ(l)∗,ν(l)∗
and the lower bound, LB(l).
6 Solve the master problem and obtain δ∗, a(l)∗, and the
upper bound UB(l).
7 l← l + 1
2) Master and Primal Problems: Here, we decompose (P4)
into two sub-problems. The Primal and Master problems are
presented as follows.
Primal Problem (l-th iteration): For the given optimal bi-
nary variables at iteration l − 1, a(l−1)∗, the primal problem
can be formulated as follows:
max
p
U(p) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
pi,jTi,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
s.t. C1, C˜2, C5,
C˜6 :
Ti,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
≤ a(l−1)∗i,j Tj , ∀i, j.
This problem can be solved using standard convex optimization
methods including interior point algorithm [20].
Master Problem (l-th iteration): The master problem,
which provides the upper bound of the solution, is formulated
based on the Lagrangian of the primal problem. The Lagrangian
of the primal problem can be written as:
L(p,a,β,γ,ν) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
pi,jTi,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
−
M∑
j=1
βj
(
N∑
i=1
Ti,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
− Tj
)
−
N∑
n=1
M∑
j=1
γi,j
(
pi,j − λi,jαj
Ti,j
)
−
N∑
n=1
M∑
j=1
νi,j
(
Ti,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
− ai,jTj
)
,
where β,γ,ν represent the Lagrange multipliers associated
with constraints C˜2, C5, C˜6, respectively. Assume the optimal
values of the Lagrange multipliers of the primal problem are
β(l)∗,γ(l)∗,ν(l)∗ at iteration l. Hence, the master problem can
be formulated as:
max
δ,a
δ (9)
s.t. δ ≤ L(p∗,a,β(l)∗,γ(l)∗,ν(l)∗), ∀l
C3, C4.
Given the optimal values of p∗ and optimal values of Lagrange
multipliers, the master problem is a MILP which can be
solved optimally by any standard optimization toolboxes, e.g.,
MOSEK [21]. The GBD algorithm for this problem is described
in Algorithm 1.
B. Sub-optimal Heuristic Solution
Since by increasing the number of users N and the number
of blocks M the computation complexity of the GBD algorithm
increases considerably, we need to come up with a more
practical solution with a lower complexity. The basic idea for
our proposed heuristic algorithm is to solve (P3) for a given
assignment variable a as a convex optimization problem with
respect to p in one shot. To obtain this assignment variable, we
first consider an extreme case where Tj →∞, ∀j, for which
constraint Cˆ2 is redundant. In this case, the objective function
in problem (P3) is decoupled in terms of {pi,j}. As a result,
the corresponding optimal value for pi,j , ∀i, j can be directly
obtained as:
p˜i,j =
αjλi,j
Ti,je
, ∀i, j. (10)
Substituting (10) into (P3), problem (P3) can be reduced as:
(P5) : max
a
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
ai,jλi,j
s.t. C3, C4.
After obtaining the optimal assignment from (P5) as a∗, by
substituting it into (P3), the optimization problem (P6) over p
can be obtained:
max
p
U(p,a∗) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
a∗i,j
(
pi,jTi,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
)
s.t. C1, C3, C4, C5
C˜2 :
N∑
i=1
a∗i,j
(
Ti,j
αj
ln
λi,jαj
Ti,jpi,j
)
≤ Tj ,∀j
Since the above optimization problem is convex, it can be solved
using standard convex optimization toolboxes such as CVX.
The solution of the above optimization problem provides a
sub-optimal solution with much lower computation complexity.
It should be noted that for the GBD algorithm, at each iteration,
one convex optimization and one MILP should be solved. Thus,
assuming that it converges in L iterations, we need to solve
L convex optimization problems and L MILPs. In contrast,
for our proposed sub-optimal algorithm, solving one integer
linear programming (P5) and one convex optimization problem
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Figure 2: Revenue of the manager vs. time for each block.
(P6) is sufficient. This leads to a significant decrease in the
computational complexity.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In simulations, we assume N = 5 as the number of the AdCs
and M = 15 as the number of blocks. The design parameter
for each AdC at each block Ti,j , ∀i, j and the maximum
satisfaction value λi,j , ∀i, j are generated randomly based on
the uniform distribution in the ranges [0, 4], [0, 10], respectively.
We consider a city map divided into 12 blocks (3 × 4 grid). In
this map, the number of vehicles in each block are in the range
of [1, 30]. The parameter αj is proportional to the density of
vehicles in each block. As a baseline, we compare our proposed
schemes with random block assignment. Note that in the random
block assignment scheme, the blocks are assigned randomly in
(P3) and the problem (P3) is solved with respect to the price
variables. It is assumed that Tj = T, ∀j.
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, the revenue of the block manager
and sum-utility of the AdCs are shown for different vehicle
densities, respectively. The performance of the GBD algorithm,
the sub-optimal algorithm and random block assignment with
optimal prices are depicted versus time. It can be seen that
GBD and the sub-optimal algorithm perform very closely to
each other and their performance is much better than that of
random block assignment. However, it should be noted that
the computation complexity of GBD is much higher than that
of our sub-optimal algorithm. As a result, for large networks,
it is better to use the sub-optimal algorithm enjoying lower
complexity, which leads to almost the same revenue. It is also
observed that by increasing the value of T the revenue stops
increasing. The reason is that the objective function in P4 is
concave and has a global optimal solution. Thus, after a certain
point, increasing T can not affect the solution of the problem
anymore. That means the AdCs have essentially reached their
maximum satisfaction and increasing the allocated time, won’t
further improve their utilities. Moreover, if the vehicle density
increases, both the revenue of the manager and the sum-utility
of the AdCs increase.
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Figure 3: Sum-utility of the AdCs vs. time for each block.
In Fig. 4, the revenue of the manager is depicted versus the
density of the vehicles in each block. Similar to the previous
results, the GBD and the sub-optimal algorithms exhibit almost
identical performance, while the random assignment has much
worse performance. As can be seen from Fig. 4, by increasing
the density of the vehicles, the revenue of the manager increases
due to the larger number of vehicles targeted for advertisement.
Moreover, by increasing the density of vehicles, the gap between
the random assignment algorithm and the other two becomes
more obvious.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the time allocation among AdCs in the
context of VANET advertising. A block manager and multiple
AdCs are considered, where the manager aims to split the
utilization time between AdCs so as to increase its revenue.
We formulated the problem as a Stackelberg game aiming to
jointly maximize the utility of the manager and AdCs. It is
shown that the problem can be formulated as a mixed integer
non-linear optimization problem. The SE of the proposed game
is obtained using Generalized Bender’s Decomposition after a
reformulation. Prompted by the high complexity of the GBD
algorithm, we proposed a sub-optimal algorithm for the problem,
which enjoys lower complexity, and its performance is close to
that of the GBD.
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